SUSY is still a joke

Supersymmetry is super silly.

Exactly eight years ago to the day since I posted the blog titled ’SUSY is a joke,’ SUSY is still a joke. There has not been an iota of progress, and there will never ever be any, simply because supersymmetry is fake.

As mentioned in that short blog, an idiot then had said that “It is such a powerful new mathematical symmetry that it would be a shame if Nature didn’t make use of it.” This is his limited understanding of how Nature works. He is as anthropocentric as the Old Testament. He can only interpret the Universe and Nature in terms of human values and judgments. If the mathematical symmetry is ’powerful,’ then Nature must make use of it. The little problem here is that mathematics is a product of the human mind, and the Nature couldn’t care less about any living being including humans. It is not confined by the way humans think, or by the tools humans make use of to try to describe the Universe or Nature.

According to Quantum Physics, the fundamental particles in the subatomic world have a property known as “spin,” i.e., intrinsic angular momentum, in addition to their charge and mass, that does not have any correspondence in the macroscopic world. Some of them like the electron have a spin of ½, while other particles like the photon have a spin of 1. Nobody can visualize or explain the spinning of a massless photon, the quantum of the electromagnetic field including light, but that is another problem.

The physicists claim that there are two “families” of particles―those with half-integer (1/2, 3/2, 5/2, etc.) spin, and those with whole-integer (0, 1, 2, etc.) spin. The former are called ’fermions,’ and made up of the building blocks of the Universe―electrons, quarks, neutrinos, and so on. The latter are called ’bosons,’ and are the supposed carriers of the forces of Nature: photons, gluons, etc.

And then there were those ’morons,’ a group of particle physicists who began to look at spin about a half a century ago, in the early Seventies, and wondered if they could impose a symmetry on Nature to unite these two families of particles to provide a self-consistent Quantum Theory unifying all particles and forces in Nature, and arrogantly called the non-existent symmetry the supersymmetry. 

Basically, what they tried to prove was that every fermion would have a “superpartner particle”  in the boson world, and vice versa, with the exact same mass and charge but a different spin. They wanted this phantom supersymmetry to provide a relationship between the elementary particles that make up matter, fermions, and the “force-carrier” particles that transmit the fundamental interactions of matter, bosons, and to show that one type of particle is actually a different facet of the other type, so that the number of basic families of particles would be reduced from two to one.

Almost fifty years have passed, and to date, no evidence for supersymmetry has been found  whatsoever. Experiments at the Large Hadron Collider have ruled out the simplest supersymmetric models. They were delusional: somehow, this symmetry must have been broken in the Universe billions of years ago, driving up the masses of the super partners outside the range of the particle colliders. They could not prove this. Therefore, the problems in incomplete particle physics with severe and well-established limitations continue to persist. Supersymmetry is a massively and miserably failed theory.

What should they think of next? They will find something else to captivate the ignorant masses who are ready to be fascinated anyway by writing popular books, and hence to keep the Federal research grants flowing to make ends meet. This the only reality.

SUSY is a joke

In a news article in the 20 November 2012 issue of Nature, titled Truant particles turn the screw on supersymmetry, it is mentioned that "[SUSY] introduces more than 100 new parameters into the standard model, all adjustable." That means they can tweak the theory as they wish on the fly. How credible it is!

The most pathetic part is embedded in the last paragraph:

Fans of SUSY are likely to lose faith only if the LHC finds nothing after a year or two of high-energy running. That would force them to look for an even more audacious idea to break free from the standard model Even so, SUSY will probably live on in Mathematical Physics, says theorist Ben Allanach of the University of Cambridge, UK. "It is such a powerful new mathematical symmetry that it would be a shame if Nature didn't make use of it," he says.

What a silly — but coming from a physicist not surprising — remark! As if Nature has to follow the Mathematics invented by the fragile and severely limited human mind.

A potential misuse of brain scans for legal decisions

Everybody with conscience should worry about the recent developments in the applications of brain scans for legal decisions.

There are highly exaggerated claims being made for fMRI. There is little evidence that it can reliably distinguish a lie from the truth in any individual case, especially in the real–life, important situations in which it might be applied. It is highly doubtful that fMRI will ever be able to identify liars in anything except a few, strictly controlled circumstances. The question of how far such approaches should be taken is an ethical issue raised by the rapid progress of neuroscience.

A genetic test may definitely state something about a particular genetic make–up, for instance, about predisposition to disease. An fMRI scan, on the other hand, is just an indirect measure of neural activity based on oxygenated blood flow. Currently, neuroscientists have only the most basic and crude understanding of what this tells about how the information is processed in the brain.

The following is from Nature, 7 December 2006:

Actions speak louder than images

Can brain scans of a racist, liar or psychopath accurately tell whether that person will persecute, fib or kill? No, say experts in the ethics of neuroscience, who are increasingly concerned that such images will be used to make dangerous legal or social judgements about people's behaviour. They say it is time for scientists, lawyers and philosophers to speak up about the limitations of such techniques.

“Lawyers want to know ‘Can I put somebody on the scanner and tell if they're racist?’” says Elizabeth Phelps, a psychologist and neuroscientist at New York University who has studied the brain’s response to race. “We as a group of scientists have to be able to say that we can’t make that distinction.” Phelps spoke at a panel discussion on the emerging field of neuroethics held in New York last week.

Neuroscientists increasingly use technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging to see how blood flow in the brain changes when we see pictures, recall memories or make decisions. But these images are prompting concerns about how they might be over-interpreted or misused (see Nature 435, 254–255; 2005).

Outside the lab, neuroimaging is being touted as a way to detect lies (see Nature 437, 457; 2005) or to predict what shoppers might buy. There have been suggestions that brain imaging could be used to screen police officers for race bias by showing them faces of particular ethnicities.

But most scientists say that studies of behavioural or physical responses—for example, a person's reaction to different races in real life—should trump imaging every time. That’s because interpreting brain scans, and correlating them to actions, is inaccurate at best. All we can really gain from such studies is a more nuanced understanding of behaviour, says Phelps.

The persuasiveness of brain scans has already drawn them into the court-room. In a landmark case in the US Supreme Court in March 2005, several leading scientific groups, including the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association and the National Mental Health Association, filed briefs to support the premise that teenagers are less rational than adults.

The data included a brain-imaging study showing that the prefrontal cortex, which governs impulse control and reasoning, develops late in adolescence (see Nature 442, 865–867; 2006), and could explain some irrational aspects of teenage behaviour.

Many groups thought this study could help rule against the death penalty. But although the court ruled against the death penalty for those younger than 18, it chose not to cite the brain-imaging study, relying instead on behavioural studies that showed adolescents are more impulsive, more vulnerable to peer pressure and more affected by stress.

Stephen Morse, a professor of law and psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, thinks it was a wise decision. Although the imaging study helped to explain why a particular group might have different behaviour, the behaviour itself is more important than the changes seen in the brain, he says. Citing the study would have given it too much credibility, he adds, and opened the door for further claims that imaging predicts behaviour. “The legal and moral claims being made [from imaging studies involving very few people] are far too extensive.”

Morse is a founding member of the Neuroethics Society, set up earlier this year by a group of lawyers, philosophers and scientists to address issues raised by the use of brain scans and other future applications of neuroscience (see Nature 441, 907). Many neuroscientists are concerned about inappropriate applications of their research, but they rarely come out and say so. Scientists should speak up, but it will also take lawyers and sociologists to lay out the concerns, says Morse. “We need scientists to say what they know and what they don’t know,” he says. “But the implications are not a science question, they are a moral question, a social question, a legal question.”

The pathetic state of many unscrupulous scientists and ignorant public

There are lessons to be taken by the public from one of the biggest science fraud cases in history, as the stem-cell research fiasco in South Korea that caused at least a day of national humiliation is becoming unraveled now.

Rising of the South Korean scientist, Hwang Woo Suk, 53, from being an obscure veterinarian to fame in February 2004, as he had claimed to be the first to clone a human embryo, inserting an adult cell's nucleus into a human egg, led politicians and patient groups to arguing that cures were around the corner, if scientists could get the needed support. In his 17 June 2005 paper in Science, he said he had done the same with 11 patients, brightening the prospects for medical application of the delicate procedure that involves squeezing the genetic material out of a human egg and replacing it with DNA from an adult cell.

In August 2005, he unveiled Snuppy, the world's first cloned dog, a feat that had long frustrated other scientists. The South Korean government showered him with rewards, including two research labs now under construction and a newly created title of Supreme Scientist, an honor that comes with $2.9 million, in annual research funds.

Allegations against Hwang's June paper, however, have raised doubts about the authenticity of his other accomplishments. Hwang has rejected the accusations, claiming that his team made additional breakthroughs and at least one significant paper was under review by an international journal.

Criticism of Hwang have started when MBC-TV in Korea began an investigation after getting complaints from his former team members. In November 2005, he had to apologize for using eggs obtained unethically for his 2004 experiments. Even then, most South Koreans supported him and considered him a national hero. Critics have been often considered unpatriotic in South Korea and the scientists and detractors had to use the Internet to spread their opinions anonymously. Some of those critics said—and Hwang's team was forced to admit—that some of the pictures of stem cell lines presented for the Science article were duplicates. Critics also said that some of the DNA traces of the cells appeared identical.

On 16 December 2005, Hwang admitted irrevocable mistakes in managing data as the reason to retract the Science paper published in June. Immediately after Hwang's news conference, Roh Sung Il, the head of Miz Medi and one of the 25 co-authors of the June paper, called his own televised news conference. He called Hwang a liar who “tries to beat truth with hypocrisy and cheap tricks,” and a national hero who “finds himself in a corner” and tries to find a scapegoat. He repeated his previous claim that nine of the 11 stem cells were not authentic. Roh's claim shocked the country, generating banner headlines and, some analysts say, contributed to a sharp fall in the South Korean stock market Friday morning.

On Friday, Roh said three of the nine colonies “only exist in fictional data.” Roh said he talked with a former Miz Medi researcher who worked for Hwang before going to the University of Pittsburgh. According to Roh, the junior scientist, Kim Seon Jong, said that he fabricated data allegedly on the orders of Hwang. Hwang rejected the allegation on Friday, but raised the possibility that someone from Miz Midi sabotaged his work intentionally or by mistake. In Kim's only interview with the media, broadcast on South Korean MBC-TV on Thursday evening, he said he did “something that should not be done,” and that his “career was over.”

Roh also accused Prof. Gerald P. Schatten at the University of Pittsburgh, formerly a close associate of Hwang, of being an accomplice in all the fabrications. He said that Hwang told him Schatten made the stem cell paper with a 'rough draft' provided by Hwang who may have offered fingerprinting and teratoma—a cellular cancer on embryonic stem cells—pictures while Schatten wrote the article. Roh contended Schatten is as dishonest as Hwang, since the U.S. biologist should know the patient-specific stem cells are not real considering the incredibly quick growth of the cells.

On 13 December 2005, in a desperate, last-minute, face-saving effort, Gerald Schatten had asked that his name be removed from their landmark scientific paper and questioned whether the work had been falsified. It was too little, too late. Science said it would not remove Schatten's name. “There is no method for retracting authorship,” Science said in a statement.

The Scientific American monthly on 15 December 2005 said it was striking geneticist Hwang from a list of the year’s top 50 scientists, reacting to news that Hwang submitted flawed data with his claim that he produced stem cells tailored to individual patients. The magazine in a message on its website summed up a series of recent revelations about flaws in Hwang’s research. “With considerable disappointment, the editors of Scientific American are immediately removing Dr. Hwang Woo-suk from his honored position as Research Leader of the Year on the 2005 Scientific American 50 list” in the special December issue already published on Nov. 23.

The editors said they tried to contact Hwang in vain, adding, “We are also deeply concerned about the lasting damage that this fraud may do to the reputation of stem cell research, which we continue to regard as a highly worthy endeavor generally pursued by scientists keeping to a far higher standard of honesty and ethics.”

Meanwhile, states poured money into stem cell programs, even though there was no beef nor cures. Hype and ambition have gotten ahead of the science thanks to many unscrupulous scientists who have their own agenda. There was no private money going into this research, because the business community, justifiably so, valued it at zero. The stem-cell proponents exaggerated the state of the science and misled the public about scientific accomplishments. They promised cures that, if they ever came, would not come any time soon.

This kind of deception has been happening in other areas of science, too. However, it does not directly involve sensitive human issues. This irrelevancy to the issues at the forefront leads to many scientists being able to get away with unjustified state grants, ultimately funded by taxpayers' money, that are being expended for no major breakthroughs, but for the scientists to satisfy their egos and make their ends meet. Still, the stem-cell meltdown we have been witnessing now will not waken up the ignorant public of what has been going on in science and how much of their money is being totally trashed.

____

Originally published in Science Express on 19 May 2005
Science 17 June 2005:
Vol. 308. no. 5729, pp. 1777 - 1783

Patient-Specific Embryonic Stem Cells Derived from Human SCNT Blastocysts

Woo Suk Hwang,^1,2 Sung Il Roh,³ Byeong Chun Lee,¹ Sung Keun Kang,¹ Dae Kee Kwon,¹ Sue Kim,¹ Sun Jong Kim,³ Sun Woo Park,¹ Hee Sun Kwon,¹ Chang Kyu Lee,² Jung Bok Lee,³ Jin Mee Kim,³ Curie Ahn,⁴ Sun Ha Paek,⁴ Sang Sik Chang,⁵ Jung Jin Koo,⁵ Hyun Soo Yoon,⁶ Jung Hye Hwang,⁶ Youn Young Hwang,⁶ Ye Soo Park,⁶ Sun Kyung Oh,⁴ Hee Sun Kim,⁴ Jong Hyuk Park,⁷ Shin Yong Moon,⁴ Gerald Schatten⁷

Patient-specific, immune-matched human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) are anticipated to be of great biomedical importance for studies of disease and development and to advance clinical deliberations regarding stem cell transplantation. Eleven hESC lines were established by somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) of skin cells from patients with disease or injury into donated oocytes. These lines, nuclear transfer (NT)–hESCs, grown on human feeders from the same NT donor or from genetically unrelated individuals, were established at high rates, regardless of NT donor sex or age. NT-hESCs were pluripotent, chromosomally normal, and matched the NT patient's DNA. The major histocompatibility complex identity of each NT-hESC when compared to the patient's own showed immunological compatibility, which is important for eventual transplantation. With the generation of these NT-hESCs, evaluations of genetic and epigenetic stability can be made. Additional work remains to be done regarding the development of reliable directed differentiation and the elimination of remaining animal components. Before clinical use of these cells can occur, preclinical evidence is required to prove that transplantation of differentiated NT-hESCs can be safe, effective, and tolerated.

¹ College of Veterinary Medicine, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, Korea.
² School of Agricultural Biotechnology, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, Korea.
³ Medical Research Center, MizMedi Hospital, Seoul 135-280, Korea.
⁴ College of Medicine, Seoul National University, Seoul 110-744, Korea.
⁵ Hanna Women's Clinic, Seoul 137-872, Korea.
⁶ School of Medicine, Hanyang University, Seoul 471-701, Korea.
⁷ Pittsburgh Development Center, Magee-Womens Research Institute, Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Reproductive Sciences and Department of Cell Biology and Physiology, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA.

On the beginning of time

Quentin Smith, in a paper published in Noûs, 1985, and titled “On the Beginning of Time,” argues that if one wants to defend that there is a beginning of time, then one has to establish first that the objection “Everything that begins does so in time; therefore, time itself cannot have a beginning,” is invalid. He goes on to say that this argument relies on the premise that “to begin” means (1) there is an earlier time at which the thing or state is not, and (2) there is a later time at which the thing or state is, so that it is impossible for time to begin, since that would involve a time earlier than time.

However, “to begin,” according to Smith, has different meanings when applied to time, and things and states in time. As applied to time, it means (1) there is an interval of time, such that every other interval of the same length is later than that interval, and (2) prior to any interval of a given length, there is at most a finite number of intervals of the same length.

The analysis is invalid for a dense time, if the phrase “of the same length” is not added. If time is discrete, there is a “first moment”: there is one interval of the shortest length that is earlier than every other interval, and there is also an earliest interval of each length.

Smith then goes on to describe what Quinton, Swinburne, Moore, Alexander and Kant argued: earlier-later relational structure of time entails the beginninglessness of time. For example, Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things, p. 88, 1973) asserts that time

has no beginning in the sense that there is no date an earlier date than which cannot be significantly described... Infinity, we might say, is a necessary feature only of systems of description, not merely those which contain numbers but any which contain such transitive asymmetrical relations as “smaller than” and “further than” and “earlier than.”

In regard to any date, an earlier date can be “significantly described,” but it does not follow that every such description has a reference. If time began x billion years ago, then we can have a concept of x+1 billion years ago, but this concept will not signify anything.

According to Smith, Quinton's claim that infinity is a necessary feature of systems of descriptions containing the relation “earlier than” is questionable: it is possible to construct such a system that is finite. “Earlier than” could be defined as obtaining between terms each of which corresponds to a different number in the series 0-100. The term corresponding to 0 is the earliest term. Even if infinity were a necessary feature of these systems, it still would be possible to construct a system representative of a time that begins; “earlier than” could be defined as obtaining among terms each of which corresponds to a number in the series of positive integers of order type ω (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...), such that the term corresponding to 0 is the earliest. This system describes a time that begins, but does not end.

Then Smith states that Richard Swinburne offers a different argument to show that time is necessarily infinite (Space and Time, p. 172, 1981):

Time, like space, is of logical necessity, unbounded. After every period of time, which has at some instant an end, there must be another period of time, and so after every instant another instant. For either there will be swans somewhere subsequent to a period T, or there will not. In either case, there must be a period subsequent to T, during which there will or will not be swans. By an analogous argument any period which has a beginning must have been preceded by another period, and hence time is necessarily unbounded.

The “analogous argument” for the beginninglessness of time would read:

Before every period of time which has at some instant a beginning, there must be another period of time, and so before any instant another instant. For either there were swans somewhere prior to a period T or there were not. In either case, there must have been a period prior to T, during which there were or were not swans.

However, Swinburne's assertion that “either there were swans somewhere prior to a period T or there were not” is true only if prior to a period T, there was another period in which there were or were not swans. This assertion does not prove that prior to any period T there was a time, but assumes it. Suppose this assumption be denied; in this case, for some period T there was no prior period, and consequently the disjunction, “either there were or were not swans prior to T,” is false.

Smith then discusses G. E. Moore's two principles (Some Main Problems of Philosophy, pp. 191-2, 1953):

... the principles that before any or every length of time, there must have elapsed one other equal to it, and that after any or every length of time, there must have elapsed one other equal to it. What are we to say of these two principles? They do seem to me to be self-evident; but I confess I do not know exactly how to set about arguing that they are self-evident. The chief thing to be done is, I think, to consider them as carefully and distinctly as possible, and then to see whether it does seem as if they must be true; and to compare them with other propositions, which do seem to be certainly true, and to consider whether you have any better reason for supposing these other propositions to be true than for supposing this one to be so. Consider, for instance, the proposition that, since I began to lecture this evening, some time certainly has elapsed. Have you any better reason for believing this, than for believing that, if so, a length of time equal to this one must have elapsed before it? And that this must be true of every length of time equal to that which has elapsed since I began to lecture? I cannot see that you have any better reason for believing the one proposition than for believing the other.

Smith reanalyses the situation. The reason to believe the proposition that some time elapses since the beginning of the lecture is because one experiences the lapse of time, i.e., the reason is empirical. There is a logical gap between one's beliefs that lengths of time did elapse and the supposition that lengths of time must have elapsed. To bridge this gap, one must acquire reasons of a different sort than those substantiating one's beliefs that lengths of time did elapse. The latter reasons are empirical, but the former are a priori, based on entailments between concepts. However, no contradiction in the idea that there is an earliest interval of time of every length can be found. Thus, such a priori reasons cannot be found.

Seeming plausibility of Moore's example is based upon his claim that I am “certain” that a length of time elapsed since the beginning of the lecture and that I believe that a length of time equal to this one “must have” elapsed prior to it. Moore is taking “certainty” and “must” to refer to necessary truths, and by this he means he effects a “smooth and easy transition” as it were from the beliefs about the experienced time during and before the lecture to the belief about the necessary infinitude of time. The problem, however, is that as expressive of my belief that time elapsed during and before the lecture, “certainty” and “must” do not refer to necessary conceptual truths about time, but convey my confidence in my observation that time has passed.

Smith states that Samuel Alexander also suffers from this type of failure to distinguish the empirical and a priori beliefs about time (Space, Time and Deity, p. 42, 1979; he is talking of space, but means his argument to apply equally to time):

The infinitude of Space and Time is another of their experienced features and like their continuity is a percept extended by thought... The sensible or perceptual datum is that each finite time is a part of a longer one. The infinite Time is the perceptual datum as qualified by the introduction of this conceptual element. The something or other which we feel to be the longer time of which a finite time is a fragment becomes extended into totality... The infinite Time is thus the positive object of which the finitude of any given portion, apprehended as finite, is the limitation.

Alexander's argument reminds Smith Kant's dictum (CPuR A32/B47-8):

The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations of one single time that underlies it. The original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited.

Smith asserts that Alexander's claim that each experienced interval of time is experienced as a part of a longer interval is false, because the longest interval of which we have experience by definition is not experienced as part of a longer interval. And we do have experience of a longer interval, for we are not infinitely temporally extended beings who experience an infinite number of longer and longer lengths of time.

Nevertheless, he goes on, the longest interval of which we have experience can be conceived to be a part of a longer interval. In fact, it is an priori truth that for each finite interval a longer and limiting interval can be conceived. In this sense, the representation of the infinity of time underlies a priori the representation of any finite time. But this does not mean that the time is infinite. The conceivability of longer and longer intervals to infinity does not entail their actuality, but merely their possibility. Whether the concepts of these intervals are instantiated is a matter to be decided empirically, by prediction or retrodiction, not by conceptual analysis. Smith believes that, in this respect, Alexander and Kant made an error analogous to Quinton's: they tacitly inferred from “it is necessarily the case that for each finite interval, a longer interval is thinkable” to “it is necessarily the case that for each finite interval, a longer interval is actual.”

So concludes Smith his argument against the aformentioned thinkers on the beginning of time. But if indeed he truly represents their arguments, these arguments seem to be as featherweight as one can witness in high school debates. They do not make much sense to begin with.

An ordinary product from ordinary minds: quantum mechanics

Theoretical physicists, somewhat in a self-serving, expedient manner, qualify quantum mechanics (QM) as an “elegant,” “beautiful” theory. It is usually considered to be a “difficult” theory, too. Somewhat “mysterious” and “counterintuitive,” it is regarded to be the “gem” of modern physics, mainly due to its predictive power of microscopic events as perceived by humans, based not on direct observations of atomic objects obviously, but on measurements in indirect ways.

From a practical, realistic and pragmatic engineer's point of view, none of these attributes makes much sense. Not only the QM concepts are no different than that of classical mechanics, but also its mathematical formalism is completely borrowed from the latter. There is nothing new or original about the foundations of QM. There was no need to develop any new mathematical theory to describe it. Even the Hilbert-space abstraction applied to QM by von Neumann in 1930 is classical.

Besides, its various philosophical interpretations, as expressed by no other than physicists themselves, do not make any sense, either. The euphemism used to describe its nonsensical features is its being counterintuitive.

Linearity, superposition, time variance and invariance, Hamiltonians, Hermitian operators, differential equations, linear harmonics, Fourier series, noncommutitavity, matrices, and complex numbers—all the mathematical tools used to describe it had already been introduced and employed in other fields long before QM was formalized. It took a quarter of a century for the best minds of theoretical physics to come up with an odd theory that turned out to be incomplete, far from describing the independent physical reality—Kant's Ding an sich (thing-in-itself)—and at the end these single-track physicists and philosophers blamed the supposedly noncausal, random nature of Nature for their failure.

We should not expect them to come up with a complete theory anyway, since humans including them, at this point in evolutionary history, cannot be held accountable, if they cannot explain the external reality to which they do not have direct access. Having gross physical and mental limitations, humans are incapable to grasp the reality directly, only relying on their extremely limited perception of its appearance by their sensory organs when the object is macroscopic or through man-made, artificial instruments and gadgets when the object is microscopic.

Humans are a product of a mess called evolution. It took 3.5 billion years for the Nature to produce this freak accident. And the end product was full of junk: books and papers written by scientists refer to “apparently useless” genetic material as the junk DNA. In reality, however, the functional importance of the roughly 98% of mammalian genomes not corresponding to protein-coding sequences actually remains largely undetermined. For example, a recent study concludes that there are 481 segments longer than 200 base pairs that are absolutely conserved [100% identity with no insertions or deletions] between orthologous [a gene in two or more species that has evolved from a common ancestor] regions of the human, rat, and mouse genomes, and everybody is at a loss at this point in time to explain why this could be the case. Apparently, mutations over millions of years could not scramble these so-called “ultraconserved” bits of the genome, contrary to the basic assertion of the evolution theory.

Furthermore, it turns out that 99.4% of human genetic material is identical to those of chimpanzees and bonobos, humans' closest relatives that, like any other animal in the planet, are looked down by them due to the fact that, not having the distinctively human characteristic called language, they cannot talk or write or do not have other higher cognitive activities humans claim to have. On top of everything, they are so egocentric that they believe they will eventually be able to explain the origin of the universe, life and mind. They have not gotten their lesson from Copernicus' revolution.

On one hand, denying any genuinely goal-directed process in Nature, they claim the evolution is aimless and purposeless, essentially based on chance mutations. On the other hand, as a freak accident of that random process and with about 98% “junk” DNA in each of the trillion cells in their bodies making up organs such as kidneys and hearts, each of which seems to have a genuine purpose after all, namely, the maintainance of their owner's livelihood, so that s/he can go on speculating about the nature of the universe, life or mind, they think they will one day solve all the mysteries and secrets about and around them. If the former assertion is true, i.e., if the evolution is nonteleological, then why would human beings be equipped by Nature with a brain to solve these mysteries? Obviously, it was not Nature's intention to evolve humans for this particular purpose—what good would it serve anyway?—as it was not its purpose to endow them with hands to tickle ivories, either. There might be those who will probably counter by claiming that this actually shows humans' ingenious resourcefulness: they were indeed creative enough to use them for other purposes. Does that mean, then, that humans have a purpose in life while the Nature does not?

Furthermore, with severely limited sensory system continuously feeding input from the external world, the same mind seems to play the role of judge, prosecutor and jury in trying to explain how consciousness arises or how mind itself works. It is self-referential and probably paradoxical.

Turning back to the lackluster yet overly exaggerated theory of QM, it is not so difficult to show that it is just another theory among others, albeit one that can describe the perceived empirical data and measurements made at atomic levels. Its incompleteness is to be expected, not only because of the reasons listed above, but also due to Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. What does not distinguish it from any other is the fact that it is yet another axiomatic theory.

The problem with today's science in general is that its theories are computational in nature. They all are based on axioms, computations and algorithms. Therefore, everything can and is intended to be reduced to being run on computers, touted as the wonder product of human imagination, especially the much-hyped and ubiquitous digital computers of our age, mainly made up of silicon, the material Nature somehow did not choose to create their creators who nevertheless opted for to solve problems Nature does not seem to wish or care them to solve.

Among many problems with QM in particular, one is that physicists, when interpreting its consequences, in a way take complex numbers, with their “imaginary” parts, literally, as opposed to engineers who employ them only as convenient tools to avoid cumbersome solutions. Not only QM is not difficult to understand or counterintuitive, in fact it is straightforward especially for those who are familiar with analog or digital circuits and networks, and the mathematical tools utilized to analyze them. Hence, it is somewhat surprising, in retrospect, why it took so many physicists so long to come up with this completely undistinguished and uninspiring theory, because all the mathematical tools were already available in the previous century, developed for entirely different reasons and applications.

Science is at a dead end

Euclid was a mathematician who lived more than 2300 years ago in the 3^rd century B.C. His most famous work was the Elements, a book in which he deduced the properties of geometrical objects and integers from a set of axioms, thereby establishing the axiomatic method of modern mathematics. Although many of the results in the Elements had originated with earlier mathematicians, one of Euclid's major accomplishments was to present them in a single, logically coherent framework.

Since then, each and every single aspect of human life has changed beyond recognition, except the axiomatic method. This is the problem of science today. It is algorithmic, too much digitized, so to speak. It seems that, at this point in the evolution of humans, the mind is incapable of explaining itself. This is probably because it is fundamentally noncomputational, contrary to the methods of science and rational thinking and what the overwhelming majority of philosophers believe.